often results in the same content being reproduced through the various outlets of one conglomerate, as this article will later discuss. The internet, on the other hand, appears to be a decentralized and undominated sphere for mass communication, and since the passage of the Act, the issue over lack of source diversity seemed easily answerable by the potentialities of the internet-where every citizen can be a receiver and originator of massmediated information. However, the recent AOL/Time-Warner union has "sparked worries that corporate consolidation now imperils the free-for-all quality of the global computer network" (Goodman and Schwartz 2000) . Moreover, the announcement "is very likely to portend other mergers and alliances" between old media (television, film, etc.) and new media (internet companies) (Hansell 2000) .
From a critical political economy perspective, this study reviews conglomeration and lack of source diversity in the media industry since the passage of the Act, and also examines the current colonization of Cyberspace by the media empires, as well as the implications for source diversity on the internet. By tracking corporate ownership of Internet service providers and search engines, it is becoming apparent that Cyberspace effectively facilitates mainstream media, which flows through just a handful of powerful media empires. This raises a critical concern over the issue of source diversity: if the internet cannot even provide a multiform of information and entertainment, then what can? Therefore, it is important to be acutely apprised of corporate presence on the internet by tracking its expansion into Cyberspace, which this study begins to do.
Media Empires, Old and New
As media have grown throughout the history of the United States, corporate control of them has also become greater. Communication empires began to develop in the late nineteenth century when businessmen like William Randolph Hearst multiplied their profits by putting together a chain of big-city newspapers. Since the early twentieth century, newspaper monopolies have developed into more powerful media territories as corporate presence in the communications industry has increasingly been characterized by conglomeration. Today, "the preponderance of U.S. mass communication is controlled by less than two dozen enormous profitmaximizing corporations" (McChesney 1997, 6) . Three of the most prominent of these conglomerates are the newly formed AOL/Time-Warner, Walt Disney Company, and News Corporation (Alger 1998, 33) .
Before the blockbuster deal with AOL, Time Warner's holdings included an imposing number of cable channels, production companies, home video and entertainment services, magazines, music companies and book publishers. To mention just a few, Time-Warner owned HBO, Cinemax, CNN, TNT, Comedy Central, E! Entertainment TV, Black Entertainment Network, Warner Brothers television, Castle Rock Entertainment, Time-Life Video, Warner Home Video, Turner Home Satellite, Sports Illustrated, People, Time, Money, Entertainment Weekly, Parenting and Life magazines, Elektra, Columbia House records, Time-Life Books, and Book-of-theMonth Club (Alger 1998, 42-4) . Now, AOL adds 22 million subscribers and can cross-promote the broad range of content provided by Time-Warner.
Disney has a plethora of media holdings in broadcasting, cable, publishing, studio recording, television production/distribution, movie production/ distribution, video production/distribution, and not to mention theme parks, resorts, travel interests, and retail stores. The Disney empire includes (but is not limited to) the ABC Television Network, ABC Radio Network, numerous television and radio stations, several cable channels (ESPN, Disney, A&E, Lifetime, etc.), feature film companies (Disney, Touchstone, Hollywood, Miramax, Buena Vista, Caravan), newspapers, magazines, and so on (Alger 1998, 36-8) . Disney also owns the Go Network, an internet search engine, as well as several other web sites.
News Corp. owns Fox Broadcasting Co., Fox News Channel, Fox Sports Net, 22 U.S. television stations, motion picture companies (including 20th Century Fox), magazines (TV Guide, Seventeen, Elle, etc.) , book publishers (HarperCollins, Barnes & Noble, Ballinger, etc.), several satellite television companies, and a multitude of newspapers in several parts of the globe (Alger 1998, 48-50) .
Lack of Source Diversity and Prescribed Remedies
With these type of conglomerated media structures, newsstands still hold rows and rows of newspapers and magazines on a variety of subjects, cable and broadcast programming still churns out, as do movies and records. They are likely, however, to be variations of the same themes and messages (Golding and Murdock 1996, 20) . For instance, Top 40 radio, network prime-time programming, and genre television programs have always been criticized for lack of diversity, which is a significant phenomenon. Thus, while the wide array of media may imply a rich variety of entertainment and information, it may in fact represent an increasingly narrow range of sources.
Since the "Golden Age" of television three broadcast networks controlled all of prime-time programming in American homes, and there were many complaints about the sameness among ABC, CBS, and NBC. In 1970, the FCC established a "prime-time access rule" (PTAR), which limited the amount of programming these networks could provide to their affiliates to just three hours between 7 and 11 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time). PTAR prohibited "affiliated stations in the top 50 television markets from using off-network series during access periods" (Albarran 1996, 215) . The rule was "designed to release some prime television time from network control" so programming from independent producers and local station could develop (Barron 1973, 188-89) . To no avail, network affiliates often used syndicated reruns and game shows to fill the extra hour because there was still pressure to select programming that was less expensive and that would draw the largest audience possible. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt admitted that the rule "certainly didn't promote program diversity" and that further government intervention would not work either (Hundt 1996) . A new (and reverse) strategy was adopted when the FCC repealed the prime-time access rule in 1995 and sought to promote vertical integration within media companies to increase horizontal competition among providers (Hundt 1996) . Media companies were already lobbying Congress for further deregulation of their industry and, anticipating passage of the Telecommunications Act, the flurry of mega-media-mergers began to erupt in 1995 when Disney purchased Capital Cities/ABC (which merged several film studios with a major broadcast network, including ten television stations, twentyone radio stations, cable networks, and publications). Shortly thereafter CBS acquired Westinghouse, and News Corp. purchased New World Communications Group. This acquisition united another film power house to another broadcast network and the leading television station owner in the United States (Howard 1998, 30; Chan-Olmsted 1998, 40) . The strategy, according to Hundt (1996) , was to allow the broadcast networks to team-up with movie studios and other sources of programming to compete with cable television (Hundt 1996) .
Ironically, at the same time, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was ushered in under the rubric of "protecting consumers against monopolies" (Clinton 1996) . President Clinton said at the signing ceremony that the new law "guarantees the diversity of voices our democracy depends upon" (Clinton 1996) . Vice President Gore, who had promoted the legislation, also added that "in the interest of promoting diversity of voices and viewpoints that are so important to our democracy, this legislation will prevent undue concentration in television and radio ownership" (Gore 1996) . However, the new law has done exactly the opposite of what it was said to do. Section 202(a) of the Act eliminates "any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast stations which may be controlled by any one entity." Section 202(c) erases any provision limiting the number of television stations that can be owned by a single source, and Section 202(f) wipes away restraints against a single entity controlling a network of broadcast stations and cable systems. The only limits placed on television ownership was a 35 percent cap of the total national audience. Prior to the 1996 Act, television ownership was limited to just twelve stations and 25 percent of the national market. Radio ownership was limited to just forty stations and 25 percent of the national market. Local ownership combinations of radio and television, television and newspaper, radio and newspaper, and television and cable were also prohibited before the Act. Now, however, all these restrictions were stripped away. Rhetoric before the passage of the Act about preventing undue concentration of media ownership appears to be a vacant promise. Drushel (1998) found that since the passage of the Act, horizontal concentration of the top 50 radio markets in the United States has nearly doubled as major conglomerates like Disney/ABC and CBS have acquired individual stations and other ownership groups. The concentration of ownership has not resulted in increased listener choice, but rather, increased advertising rates for fewer sources "in control of a popular and pervasive mass medium" (Drushel 1998, 19) . Howard (1998) has shown that the number of group-owned stations increased from 898 in 1995 to 1,006 in 1997, while the number of group owners decreased from 210 in 1995 to 184 in 1997 (pp. 25-6) . Thus, the number of television stations per owner has increased substantially, and continues to do so. Currently, more than eight out of every ten television stations in the top 100 U.S. markets are group owned (Howard 1998, 31) . The FCC is also considering whether to allow some local television station duopolies, as well as local cross-media ownership of newspapers and television stations, in the near future (Howard 1998, 28-31) . Some in Congress are even considering the removal of any and all limits on broadcast ownership, and the National Association of Broadcasters is pushing them to make this happen quickly (Schwartzman 1999, 6-7) . Just recently, the FCC voted to allow television station owners to buy a second station in the same market for the first time in history (Lieberman and Davidson 1999, 1B) .
Vertical Integration of Media
Through integration of different types of media, corporate conglomerations can produce a preponderance of the information and entertainment that circulate through the media. Through synergy, film studios, television networks, cable networks, music studios, record distributors, publishing companies, magazines and various commercial outlets under blanket ownership can help the market value for each other. For instance, company newspapers can give free publicity to their television stations, and television shows can give publicity to the movies that their film studios are producing. It may not exactly be "free" publicity, but the profits and expenditures seem to keep circulating via the same corporate ties, which suggests more than a little advantage. Disney, for example, is able to promote its films by selling soundtracks on their record labels, broadcast the films on their television network, print a book version, deliver rave magazine reviews and offer merchandising to boot (not to mention Saturday morning cartoons) (Pecora 1998) .
This process of corporate conglomerations owning the companies that produce the products that they also distribute is known as vertical integration. For example, media conglomerates may own movie studios, record labels, television shows, books, and magazines, which represent the product line. Vertically integrated conglomerates may also own cable systems, retail stores, music clubs, book stores, theme parks, home video distributors and movie theaters, which represent the distribution line. That corporations own several different forms of media production and distribution outlets is a key element of conglomeration. Through this type of vertical integration, conglomerates can repackage fewer creative productions through more distribution outlets. Media conglomerates that own motion picture studios want "blockbuster hits that can be reproduced in a range of media forms. That is why the key holding for today's media conglomerates is a film studio" ("Media Conglomerates" 1998, 14) . Film studio's can provide television reruns, home videos, book versions, sound tracks and an overabundance of merchandising (T-shirts, posters, and action-figures), and so on.
Conglomerates with vast holdings also have greater financial power to either drive out new entrants into the marketplace or buy them out. In 1996, just seven companies accounted for nearly all of U.S. music sales (Who Controls the Music? 1997). Each of these seven companies (Time-Warner, Sony, Phillips Electronics, Seagram, Bertelsmann AG, and EMI) control several smaller labels. These conglomerates have the capacity to launch expensive promotional campaigns and offer big discounts to advertisers. Meanwhile, independent labels struggle each year not to be shut down by the major ones.
Growing Dominance of the Media Conglomerates
Today's media conglomerates have far outgrown the newspaper chains of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Now they are more akin to "global lords" as their command of information production and dissemination is world wide (Bagdikian 1989) . For instance, "Rupert Murdoch, Ted Turner and very few others [are] in a position to transmit their Western images and commercial values directly into the brains of 75 percent of the world's population" (Mander 1996, 13 ). Today's business community is a global one, and just as McDonalds and Pizza Hut exist in Russia, so too does CNN. The difference here is that information, not hamburgers, are the commodity, and that is troublesome. Via these patterns of ownership it appears that the structure of today's media system is evolving in a way where a handful of communication empires shape information and control public images over increasingly larger populations (Mander 1996) . As Bagdikian (1989) has suggested, Neither Caesar nor Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt nor any Pope, has commanded as much power to shape information on which so many people depend to make decisions about everything from whom to vote for to what to eat. (P. 809) In light of these concerns, however, it seems possible that new communication technology may resist the pervading concentration of ownership.
One possibility of subverting the locus of control that the media elite now enjoy is the internet because of some of its unique dynamics. Due to the suffusion of telephone lines, the internet can connect individuals from all around the globe by providing a decentralized, undominated public sphere, where everyone could have access to receive and disseminate messages across the world. Considering the overbearing structure of media conglomeration though, can the veins of Cyberspace effectively function as a conduit for information, ideas and culture without the preponderant influence of the corporate elite? As Lenert (1998) has noted, The trend toward convergence has accelerated, and the historical divisions among the media categories of telephone, print, and broadcast are increasingly difficult to sustain. Most major newspapers now have electronic editions. Consumers can now access the internet by using their television, and telephone calls can be made using the infrastructure normally associated with cable television. In light of technological pressures of convergence, it is often easier for the state to deregulate communications rather than attempt to sustain increasingly abstract distinctions among media. McChesney (1997) has also warned that "the notion that the Internet will permit humanity to leapfrog over capitalism and corporate communication is in sharp contrast to the present rapid commercialization of the Internet" (p. 30).
The Critical Political Economy of Media Empires
As the internet may be seen as an alternative to the communications oligarchy, this study seeks to demonstrate how the internet is being incorporated into that very same oligarchy. As a well-suited critical political economy critique, it "takes its intellectual vigor from [Marxism]" and sees monopolistic and oligopolistic industries "as inimical to the social and economic benefits of the masses" (Rush and Blanco 1998, 6) . Gandy (1992) has noted that one of the challenges of traditional Marxist theory and political economy studies "is to describe the ways in which more and more activities are incorporated into the capitalist sphere of production" (p. 35). As a political economy critique, this study is concerned with "ownership, support mechanisms (e.g., advertising), and government policies [which] influence media behavior and content" (McChesney 1998, 3) . While many economists may see the marketplace as unquestionably benevolent and self-righting, critical political economists do not automatically make this assumption.
Perhaps, it is worth distinguishing critical political economy from two other economic perspectives-liberal political economy and classical political economy-as do Golding and Murdock (1996) . Liberal political economists are attentive to the market exchange between consumers and competing commodities. They would assert that the greater play in market forces means greater "freedom" of consumer choice (Golding and Murdock 1996, 14) . Therefore, liberal political economists believe that privatization of public services and communications is preferable because it increases consumer choice. Classical political economists would also assert that government intervention should be minimized so that market forces can have the widest "freedom" of operation (Golding and Murdock 1996, 17) . Critical political economists diverge from both of these perspectives by seeing beyond presupposed "freedoms," and focus on distortions and inequalities in the market system, which is often characterized by monopoly or oligarchy.
In political economy studies, Gomery (1993) argues that tracking corporate ownership is but one part of the analysis, as the connection needs to be made between media economics and normative concerns, such as "how best to promote diversity" (pp. 191-92) . Gomery also discusses how different market structures (monopoly, oligopoly, and competition) influence corporate conduct. For instance, an oligopoly where just a few entities dominate the market often leads to sameness and lack of diversity among the key competitors. Gomery offers the example of network television where if NBC offers a new comedy at a particular time on a particular day, its rivals-ABC, CBS, and Fox-counterprogram. This leads to some experimentation, although all too often it means only a numbing generic sameness where like programs (e.g., comedies, dramas, or soap operas) face off against each other. (P. 194) An oligopolistic structure also influences corporate conduct at large, as the recent trend in conglomeration indicates. Through synergy, the major conglomerates (Time-Warner, Disney, Fox) are not solely reliant on the profits of a single operation, and unprofitable "subsidiaries can be reconstructed and repositioned with funds generated from other profitable ongoing businesses," and thus, this "enables an oligopoly to offer a high barrier to entry; potential rivals lack this conglomerate protection" (Gomery 1993, 193) . Even though the internet has been touted as a decentralized and undominated public sphere, it is possible that the preeminent conglomerates in every other medium may be staking substantial claims on this developing territory. The danger presented here is that dominant media giants can use "their existing media to constantly promote their on-line ventures, and their relationships with major advertisers to bring them aboard Internet ventures" (McChesney 1997, 31) . Disney, for instance, is able to use its internet portal (Go Network) as another outlet to repackage their movies, books, and cartoon characters. Moreover, search engines controlled by commercial media companies are more likely to direct users to more consumer-oriented web sites, rather than information-oriented sites that are not sponsored by advertisers. Also, because search engines receive the most traffic on the internet, companies that control these sites can charge higher prices for onscreen ads and can charge higher toll fees from users.
In their book on global media, Herman and McChesney (1997) begin to look at how the internet and digital communication are being "incorporated" into these empires. In their view, "the Internet and the digital revolution do not pose an immediate or even foreseeable threat to the market power of the media giants" (p. 107). However, the authors stop short from making any more specific forecasts. As they say, "we are at the beginning of the digital era, so prediction beyond broad brushstrokes is problematic" (p. 107). The goal of this study then, is to begin to offer more details about the current online environment by analyzing internet search engines.
Procedures for Analysis
With these propositions in mind, this article will examine the following questions: what are the predominant commercial service providers and search engines on the World Wide Web? Who owns these commercial service providers and search engines? Are they connected vertically to other media conglomerates, or horizontally to other service providers/search engines? Have the commercial service providers or search engines been subject to the merger frenzy that has characterizes most media ownership? And, do these commercial service providers and search engines help popularize internet versions of other mainstream media (for instance, repackage other creative content within a conglomerate)?
To answer these questions the author has sought out the business sections of major U.S. newspapers and other popular news sources-online and off (The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, USA Today, Washington Post, MSNBC, etc.) for information regarding mergers and acquisitions of online companies to other media conglomerates. These are the primary sources for news regarding corporate mergers and acquisitions and are published daily, which makes them an excellent reference to study.
Internet ratings services, such as Nielsen Media Research, NetRatings, Inc., 2 and Media Metrix were also consulted for information regarding search engine and portal rankings. Although these services are intended to give "a boost to information providers and advertisers eager to transform the net into a commercially viable medium," they will also be extremely useful in this study to indicate which internet search engines and other web properties have risen to popularity (Berniker 1995, 34) . Information derived from these services may also give some indications about whether there is a lack or abundance of source diversity in the newly emerging search engine market.
One of the ways to analyze market structures, as Albarran (1996) suggests, is to look at the concentration of the number of producers within a particular market. This is significant because "the lower the number of producers, the larger the degree of power each individual [producer] will wield" within a market (Albarran 1996, 29) . Albarran (1996) suggests two approaches to measuring concentration in media economics: one way is to measure "the percentage of the market (using circulation or ratings data) reached by competitors through the product," and the second way involves calculating the percentage of revenues/sales controlled by the top firms (p. 30). A market is considered highly concentrated if the top four firms have revenues that are equal to (or greater than) 50 percent of the entire industry; or the top eight firms have revenues that are equal to (or greater than) 75 percent of the entire industry. A market is considered only moderately concentrated if the top four firms have revenues that are equal to (or greater than) 33 percent (but less than 50 percent) of the entire industry, or the top eight firms have revenues that are equal to (or greater than) 50 percent (but less than 75 percent) of the entire industry. Lastly, a market is considered lowly concentrated if the top four firms have revenues that are less than 33 percent of the entire industry or the top eight firms have revenues that are less than 50 percent of the entire industry (Albarran 1996, 48) .
For this study, a combination of the two approaches suggested by Albarran (1996) will be utilized, considering that internet search engines do not derive revenues directly from web users. Therefore, the concentration ratios will be applied to the percentage of the web visitors (using web ratings data) that utilize the different search engines. A similar study was conducted in 1997 and found that a relatively small number of sites (5 percent of the sample) commanded a large portion (74.81 percent) of traffic on the web (Markoff 1999, C4) .
Destination: Cyberspace
The primacy of corporate control reigns supreme in all media industries, and the internet is turning out to be no exception as a few large commercial search engines, such as Yahoo, Netscape, Excite, Lycos, and Infoseek, have already risen to popularity (NetRatings 1999) . Moreover, these popular search engines are relentlessly being sought out by the popular broadcast networks. Just recently, Fox (News Corp.) made a deal with Yahoo, CBS firmed-up an agreement with AOL, NBC (General Electric) has stakes in CNET's Snap portal service, and ABC (Disney) has acquired a substantial portion of Infoseek (Pope 1999) and has started the new Go Network. So far, it appears that the cross-promotional ties between broadcast networks and search engines is having some effect on the popularity of those search engines. Since NBC acquired part of Snap search engine, it has moved up from virtual obscurity to be ranked at number five on the list of most popular search sites during the month of (Media Metrix 1999 . Meanwhile, the Go Network, which was just created in late 1998, has already emerged as the second most popular search site behind Yahoo (Media Metrix 1999). As Search Engine Watch (1999a) explains, "Snap has benefited from advertising running on its partial owner, NBC television." Likewise, the Go Network has a distinct advantage with its ties to the Disney empire and its many cross-promotional outlets.
Currently, the major broadcast networks and other media conglomerates are also fighting it out for Lycos, and "odds are someone will make the company an offer it can't refuse in the near future" (Fry and Hanrahan 1999) . Lycos is currently entertaining offers from CBS, ABC (Disney), Fox (News Corp.), Time-Warner, Bertelsmann AG, and Viacom, as well as other internet companies, such as Microsoft, AOL, Yahoo, and Amazon.com (Fry and Hanrahan 1999) . An interesting point is that the top internet service providers have also been part of the merger frenzy that has characterized other media ownership. For instance, in a bedazzling three-way deal, Compu-Serve merged with AOL and WorldCom in January 1998. The deal allowed WorldCom to sell CompuServe's consumer subscriber base to AOL. In addition, AOL has a pending acquisition of Netscape Communications Corp. (Fry and Hanrahan 1999) .
The ever-changing world of mergers and acquisitions in Cyberspace may be too fleeting for this article, but the strategies behind the deal-making are not. Media giants, and broadcast networks in particular, have found the internet to be another valuable tool in their synergy to attain larger audiences. As Pope (1999) explains, The Web until recently has been used primarily as a promotional vehicle. All of the major networks have extensive sites that they use to pitch their shows, with NBC even offering separate, online storylines for its drama "Homicide."
However, the deals are getting much sweeter, as Yahoo has agreed to spend $20 million in advertising on the Fox network, and in return, Fox will insert Yahoo into the storylines of some its shows (Pope 1999) .
Disney is probably making the most sophisticated user of its internet arm after purchasing a 43 percent stake of Infoseek in the summer of 1998 (Stone 1999, 61) . With Infoseek, "Disney improves its ability to attract and keep Internet users and turn them into customers for a wide variety of products both on line and off" (Koch 1998 ). Indeed, Disney now stems to the internet as another outlet to repackage their movies, books, and cartoon characters. Jake Winebaum, 3 who heads up Disney's internet ventures, said in a recent interview with Time magazine, "We know how to get a consumer online to make purchases" (Maloney 1998, 34) . Ironically, Winebaum adds to his comment that "the Internet is the ultimate medium about synergy" (Maloney 1998, 34) .
Since the procurement of Infoseek, Disney created the new Go Network, which is powered by the Infoseek search engine. 4 And, just recently, Disney has moved to take full ownership of Infoseek and is pairing it up with their Buena Vista Internet Group in order to pursue a more "aggressive" strategy on the broadband (Tedesco 1999) .
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With full control over Infoseek, Disney will now revamp its Go Network portal to give Disney brand names "a more prominent presence" on the search engine (Tedesco 1999) . Kevin Mayer, the executive vice president of Disney's Buena Vista Internet Group, said the takeover of Infoseek was necessary to "eliminate any competing agendas" (Tedesco 1999 ). Disney's "agenda" will most likely focus on promoting many of its other online assets, such as Disney.com, ABCNews. com, Mr. Showbiz, ESPN.com, as well as NFL.com, NBA.com, and NASCAR.com (which are joint ventures with sports organizations), and many others.
Disney's dominant presence in Cyberspace may be dwarfed in the coming months and years by the AOL/Time-Warner deal. With AOL's 22 million subscribers, the internet service provider can cross-promote the vast array of content from Time-Warner's media divisions on its front page, such as CNN news, Warner Brothers music, and Warner Brothers films and television programs (see Kuczynski and Carter 2000) . If Disney wants to maintain its relative position of dominance on the internet, it may consider merging with another internet service provider or creating one of its own. Valdmanis (2000, 3B) says that Disney chief executive officer Michael Eisner may consider linking up with Yahoo! or cable operator AT&T to keep up with AOL/Time-Warner.
A negative implication for citizens who want to use commercial search engines for information seeking is that they will most likely be directed to consumer oriented web sites, rather than information oriented sites that are not sponsored by advertisers. As Jennifer Klein of Credit Service/First Boston told USA Today, there is growing "acceptance and success of on-line advertising, which is forecast to grow from $500 million in 1997 to an estimated $65 billion in 2001" (Koch 1998) . Also, because search engines receive the most amount of traffic on the internet, companies that control these sites can charge higher prices for onscreen ads and can charge higher toll fees from users.
Another ill from the lack of source diversity among search engines and service providers is that they help popularize internet versions of other mainstream media. For instance, ABC, Disney, and ESPN were among the most popular ten internet sites in 1997. Although ABC, Disney, and ESPN appear as three separate entities on the Top 10 list, they all stem from the corporate headquarters of Disney. Although the internet is a relatively young medium, a few major players appear to already have dominant positions. "From month to month," one or two companies may trade places on the Top 10, "but the list is relatively stable for a medium as volatile as the web is supposed to be" (Dodge 1998) .
When applying the concentration ratios suggested by Albarran (1996) to the search engine ratings provided by Media Metrix (1999), an exceedingly high level of concentration was found, which already suggests a lack of source diversity. For the month of June in 1999, Media Metrix counted the total number of users who visited a particular search engine (Media Metrix 1999). 6 Their index showed that the top four search engines attracted 81,910 different visitors from the total 119,540, which is 68.5 percent. This percentage indicates a "high" level of concentration, as it is well over the 50 percent mark required to be considered "highly" concentrated. As a matter of fact, the top two search engines (Yahoo and the Go Network) accounted for more than 43 percent of the visitors.
In addition to the search engine race, corporate firms that control U.S. journalism are also major players in "jockeying for the inside lane on the information highway" (McChesney 1996, 5) . The most popular news conglomerates in television, radio, and newspapers are already the most prominent sources for news in Cyberspace. For example, NBC has MSNBC, CNN has CNN online, Sports Illustrated (owned by the same as CNN) has a web site, ESPN (owned by Disney) has the SportsZone online, Fox Sports has a web site, as does USA Today, and the list goes on and on. There has also been an "onslaught of commercialization" online in terms of "endless home shopping" and "mindless entertainment" (Shapiro 1995, 12-14) . Just as the internet started to become popular, corporate America began to form its online colonies.
The political economic implications of concentrated corporate ownership of internet portals, search engines, and service providers are intricate. Even though the media oligarchs have established viable cyber-colonies, they do not monolithically determine that the social and cultural fare online is becoming increasingly narrow. Nonetheless, they do control and shape access onto the network, which is significant as more than 75 percent of web users utilize search engines to find content on the internet (Search Engine Watch 2000). Accordingly, media oligarchs that own the premiere portal sites, service providers, and search engines can give preferential treatment to their own content (through placement on web pages and search results), while marginalizing-or excluding-content produced by their competitors or other more independent sources. In this case, AOL's union with Time-Warner becomes increasingly significant, as it unites the top internet service provider in the United States with the leading cable service provider in the United States, and is now in a unique position to offer highspeed internet access through cable with privileged access to creative content produced within the Time-Warner empire.
Conclusion
The digitization of words, pictures, audio, and video via such a pervasive medium as the internet should empower every person to be a highly individualized producer and consumer of media. Every person from every continent should be able to circumvent mainstream television and magazines by being able to distribute media materials around the world themselves and to receive an infinite amount of other information from a vast array of sources-a real "marketplace of ideas," if you will.
Thus, we ought to be witnessing at the end of the twentieth century a transformation of media industries into hundreds and hundreds of small companies. That, anyway, is what was predicted at the start of the computer revolution. We are supposed to be living at the end of "mass" society. This is the age of media individualism, infinite free choice, consumer sovereignty. Deregulation, espoused by politicians in country after country, should be guaranteeing this great opening of the information and entertainment market. (Smith 1991, 3) Examples from recent history, however, are far from any prediction about consumer sovereignty and empowering citizenry. In the United States, at least, privatization has meant commercialization, not democratization. Deregulation in the name of competition has meant conglomeration and oligopoly in practice. Therefore, the messages of advertisers and corporate hegemony proliferates at an ever increasing rate, and Cyberspace will not likely diffuse them but, rather, echo them.
There is, of course, a more optimistic vision of things to come. Lenert (1998) posits that the "emerging technologies of the Internet and the World Wide Web are the legitimate successors to the great democratic traditions. It is yet to be decided how they will be regulated and with what social consequences," but he adds that it is important to "resist the assumption that 'liberalization equals democratization ' " (p. 19) .
In this case, it is important for those who are committed to a critical political economic analysis of mass communication to closely track a "fierce lobbying battle" that has "erupted over whether the Federal Communications Commission will consider forcing cable-television companies to open their vast networks to rivals seeking to offer high-speed Internet service" (Fry and Hanrahan 1999) . Broadband cable would offer faster connection speeds on the internet and the relationship between television and internet would likely be strengthened. Telephone and technology companies have been among the lobbyists, as they have a vested interest in the outcome. Their lobbying positions may be useful in predicting the future of integrating the internet with television, and might help explain the furious land rush in Cyberspace by the broadcast networks. Unless enforceable rules for open access to cable/internet networks (such as the one formed by the AOL/Time Warner union), media conglomerates with a vast array of interests in content production and distribution would be clear winners, while more independent producers of content would shrivel without access to the premiere networks.
With the integration of television and internet the broadcast networks could offer their own portal sites in conjunction with their television networks. Also, advertisers could increase the opportunities for viewers/ users to purchase the products and service shown during commercial breaks between programs. Just imagine a Disney ad airing in the middle of the 101 Dalmations cartoons on Saturday morning, "to order your copy of the new '101 Dalmations' video for just $19.95, just click the right mouse button." Herman and McChesney (1997) have already said that "the highly open, egalitarian, and competitive nature of the internet is being undermined by market forces even before it approaches being a mass medium" (p. 24). As they argue, "anyone can start a website," however, "it takes time and money to attract audiences and to compete with the expensive media firm websites that draw upon outside media resources" (p. 124). Herman and McChesney mostly analyze the internet market not as a broadcasting one but, rather, as a publishing one where "anyone can produce a publication, but the right to do so means little without distribution, resources and publicity" (pp. 124-125). However, Herman and McChesney quickly counter this claim by noting that the internet does permit (for people who want it) "global access to the entirety of the 'marginal' online websites," which "suggests that the Internet should remain a vital tool for political organizing, even if its dominant trajectory is as a commercially driven vehicle" (p. 125). Commercialization of the internet is indeed evident, and perhaps we should hedge our bets about any liberating potential this medium many offer.
Notes

